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1.  Introduction 
 
In many countries, during the last decades of the previous century, especially 
following the energy crisis of 1970s, there was a pronounced declining trend in 
energy intensity of production. Thus, in the OECD countries (without new 
members) the average energy intensity reduction from 1973 to 2000 exceeded 
15%. For such countries as Denmark, Germany, United Kingdom, USA, and 
Ireland the decrease was about 40%. At the same time, in transition countries 
energy consumption per unit of production stays essentially higher and exceeds 
several fold the levels of the West European countries and Japan. In our opinion, 
this circumstance could hinder further economic growth of these countries. 
For instance, RF energy intensity of production is higher than in Canada by 1/3, it 
is two times greater than in USA, Sweden and Finland, and  exceeds the level of 
most countries of Western Europe and  Japan - 3-4 times. The 3-fold production 
growth targeted by the Russian Government document "Energy Strategy of Russia 
for the period up to 2020"1 is impossible without a drastic increase in the energy 
consumption efficiency. Such an increase was proposed by one of the "Strategy" 
sections, however, such rates are hardly attainable. Thus, it was projected that in 
20 years energy use per unit of GDP would reduce more than by half and in 
addition, after 2010 the annual reduction rate of energy intensity reduction will 
exceed 5%. Such a task seems to be unprecedented on a historical scale. Thus, it is 
quite urgent to identify the main sources and means of energy conservation 
feasible for the transitional countries including Russia. 
This paper explains factors defining higher energy intensity of production in the 
former socialist countries as compared to the market economies. We confirm that 
more severe climatic conditions in most of the post-socialist countries can 
partially account for this. However, we believe that the “socialist hangover” may 
also be largely responsible for higher energy intensity in these counties. Namely, 
we show that in the economies with strong economic institutions, economic 
agents have higher incentives to implement energy conservation measures than in 
the countries with weaker institutional environment. For this purpose, we, first, 
specify transaction cost of a firm as a total cost of an economic agent on 
interaction with all his partners (Polterovich, 1999a). In such a view it includes 
some explicit fraction which could be easily taken into account when calculating 
the total project cost, and a certain implicit fraction being a sum of both monetary 
but unofficial transaction cost (e.g. bribes) and non-monetary component, such as 
“efforts”. By our proposition if economic institutions are bad and by this reason 
the markets are ineffective the total transaction cost could be high especially due 
to its implicit fraction. Further we propose a theoretical model of a representative 
economic sector including a certain number of energy consuming firms, which are 
included in an energy conservation project under the condition of uncertain 
                                                           
1 Passed by the RF Government directive No1234р, August, 28, 2003 
transaction associated with implementation of this project. Each firm can face 
both a high transaction cost (because implicit fraction of transaction cost is large), 
and a low transaction cost (when it is low). A high transaction cost completely 
stops the project because the firm perceives it difficult to realize the project, i.e. 
the total cost on its implementation is too high. But low transaction cost does not 
affect the behavior of the firms. We show that the inadequate institutional 
environment resulting in a high probability for a firm to be faced with adverse 
external conditions resulting in the high transaction cost brings about the lack of 
incentives. Thus, under such a condition the substitution effect of energy price 
change is weaker than in a tough market environment. 
Further we present a macroeconomic econometric model, which along with the 
climate and real energy price variables includes an interaction term being a 
product of a price variable multiplied by an index of institutional strength. This 
model makes it possible to calculate energy price elasticity of energy intensity of 
production being a value similar to price elasticity of conditional demand for 
energy. We tested various versions of interaction terms using different 
institutional indices and found out the key role of the conditions defining relations 
between business and bureaucracy: two institutional variables from their common 
list provided in (Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón, 1999) are of high 
significance. We present coefficients of energy price elasticity of energy intensity 
of production both by groups of the countries and for each economy from the 
sample. We show that the average of these coefficients for the CIS group  is more 
than four times lower than that for the OECD economies (by their absolute 
values); in the East European and Baltic countries these values are also visibly 
lower than in the developed countries although the difference is not so drastic 
(“only” two times). This fact implies that firms do not have sufficient incentives 
for energy conservation and, thus, may be an important factor of the higher energy 
intensity of production. 
Analysis is based on 2000 statistical data involving a large country sample, which 
along with 25 former socialist economies includes the OECD countries and also 
some states from Asia, Africa and America. A variable of unofficial economy 
added to regressions helps to improve the estimate reliability. We apply both OLS 
and IVLS estimators, institutional variables being instrumented by the infant 
mortality rate. The import oil cost per unit of oil is used to instrument energy price 
variables.  
The paper is organized in a following way. In section 2, we present a brief 
discussion of the energy consumption trends during the last decades of the 
previous century by separate groups of world economies. In section 3, a review of 
literature on the discussed topic is presented. Section 4 is devoted to the 
consideration of statistical sources, a theoretical model and specifications 
estimated. Section 5 considers results of energy intensity estimations of integrated 
models including interaction terms being calculated using various institutional 
variables. An influence of unofficial economy on the levels of specific energy 
consumption is estimated and discussed as well. The conclusion is presented in 
Section 6. 
 
2. Energy Intensity Puzzle 
 
Before the energy crisis of 1970s, the main trends in energy consumption 
especially evident in the countries with average income were increased per capita 
energy consumption and growing energy intensity. Thus, we observe that the 
average per capita consumption of commercially produced energy had practically 
doubled in today’s OECD countries from 1960s to 1973, out of which in Japan, 
Portugal, and Spain this growth was 2.5-3 times, and in Greece the increase was 
almost 5 times. Accordingly, the energy intensity of the income produced grew 
too. The average growth index of energy intensity for OECD countries over this 
period was 120%. 
During the decade following the energy crisis break-up, the energy consumption 
trends were reversed in most countries. By 1983, the average reduction index of 
GDP energy intensity for OECD countries was 10%, and by the end of the century 
this index dropped by further 4%. At the same time, however, in such OECD 
member countries as Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Japan, Great Britain, 
and USA, the reduction in the GDP energy intensity exceeded 20% over the first 
post-crisis decade and 30-40% - before the end of the century (see Fig. 1). 
Obviously, such a striking improvement  of the energy consumption efficiency in 
the above-mentioned countries should be attributed not only to the skyrocketing 
energy prices in the efficient markets but also to the special measures of 
government policy aimed at better energy conservation.  
Figure 1. Change in the GDP Energy Intensity  in Selected OECD 
Economies: 2000 to 1973, %
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The available data for the countries with socialist economy show that there too 
was a certain reduction in the output energy intensity in 1970s and 1980s, 
although is already universally recognized that the official statistics in socialist 
countries overestimated the output growth indices, and, consequently, the data on 
the energy intensity dynamics lack reliability. In the early 1990s when the 
economic reforms were launched, the GDP energy intensity in transitional 
economies significantly – as often as not several fold – exceeded the levels of 
market economies, and the situation has not changed significantly since that time 
(see Fig. 2). The initial transformation period in former socialist countries was 
characterized by increasing energy intensity of production resulting from the 
shrinking output. After this, however, in most of the above-mentioned countries 
energy intensity of production decreased fairly fast, although not everywhere it 
approached the pre-crisis levels. As was shown in (Suslov and Ageeva, 2005), the 
reduction in the energy intensity of production over the above-named period was 
little related to the increase in the energy prices, and was rather a “byproduct” of 
increase in the production and capacity utilization. 
Higher energy inputs in former socialist countries may partially be attributed to 
the inclement climatic conditions: in this part of the East Europe and the Asian 
part of the former Soviet Union average annual temperatures are significantly 
lower and the amplitude of seasonal variations is much higher than in, say, 
Western Europe. However, as our analysis showed (Suslov and Ageeva, 2005), 
this factor fails to account for the entire difference in the levels of energy 
intensity. This suggests that a significant factor affecting the levels of specific 
energy consumption is the quality of economic institutions determining the key 
aspects of economic system performance mechanism. Our hypothesis is that weak 
institutional development can lower the incentives for economic agent to take 
energy conservation measures, including the implementation of investment 
projects aimed at energy saving.  
In the later sections, a theoretical model is discussed and tested intended to 
explain why the increasing energy prices sometimes fail to result in replacement 
of energy by other factors. We suppose that the weak institutional framework 
results in unfavorable conditions for investment activity. Not only such systems 
are exposed to additional risks, which in itself can undermine the attractiveness of 
investment projects, but the inefficient markets functioning can increase the costs 
of their implementation. The banking system drawbacks, immature and often 
practically non-existent stock markets hinder and often preclude financing of 
large-scale and long-term projects. Under such conditions it can only be expected 
that the equipment used will be comparatively more obsolescent than in the 
countries with efficient institutions, which might be the cause of higher energy 
costs. Moreover, there may also be insufficient incentives for implementing 
energy-saving investment projects even when energy prices increase significantly. 
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3. Review of Literature 
 
The well-known approach to treat the relationship between output, energy 
consumption, and other production factors is based on application of translog cost 
function (Hudson and Jorgensen, 1974; Berndt and Wood, 1975, Griffin and 
Gregory, 1976). It permits, for example, to make long-term estimates of demand 
for energy price elasticity coefficients. Although this methodology has significant 
advantages, it is hardly suitable cannot properly allow for singularities of the 
objects considered. In any case, to take them into account a panel data model 
should be applied (Griffin and Gregory, 1976), but in this case it will be difficult 
to include in the samples both transitional economies and many other non-OECD 
countries, which still lack the factor price series statistics. Moreover, the translog 
cost function approach does not allow one reliably to test the significance of 
separate factors responsible for individual countries differences and at best can 
only show their aggregate impact on the energy intensity of production.  
For these reasons, we chose a simpler approach, with less stringent requirements 
to statistics. We consider an economy a system with a complex structure 
consisting of separate sectors. In this aspect, our methodology dates back to the 
Chenery hypothesis, which suggests that growth rates of economic sectors are 
correlated with per capita income level (Chenery, 1960, Chenery and Taylor, 
1968). Many authors used this framework to analyze production structure 
distortions in socialist and transitional economies (Winiecki, 1988; Doern and 
Heilemann, 1996; Jackman and Pauna, 1995). Raiser, Shaffer and Schuchhart 
(Raiser, Schaffer and Schuchhart, 2003) developed a model, linking distortions of 
the production structure with insufficient demand for services and the respectively 
low labor productivity. Thus they proved that the above-mentioned distortions are 
stable and natural for such countries.  
During the recent period, the problem of influence of the institutional strength on 
the economic outcomes attracted special attention of researchers (Rodrik, 1997; 
Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997; Wei, 1997, Johnson, Kaufman and Zodio-Lobaton, 
1998, Hall and Jones, 1999; Chong and Calderon, 1999, Kaufman, Kraay and 
Zodio-Lobaton, 1999; McArthur and Sachs, 2001; Rodrik, Subramanian and 
Trebbi, 2002). It is proved that there is a strong correlation between the quality of 
institutions and policies on the one hand, and the per capita income level on the 
other hand. For transitional economies, variations in the duration of 
transformation decline period are determined by counties' ability to maintain 
efficient government institutions and to develop market institutional framework 
(Sachs, 1999; Aslund, Boone. and Jonson, 1996; Krueger and Ciolko, 1998; 
Popov, 1998; Transition Reports, 1999, 2001). In addition, the strength of the 
transformation decline is associated with the distortions in the fixed capital, 
production and the trade patterns "accumulated" before the reforms launch (De 
Melo, Denizer, Gelb and Tenev, 1997; Krueger and Ciolko, 1998; Popov, 1999). 
The overriding importance of institutional transformation for bringing countries 
out of the economic recessions and further developments in the transitional 
countries demonstrated an urgent need for a special scientific discipline to work 
out an effective strategy and methods for the market transformation (Polterovich, 
1999b, 2001). Fredriksson, Vollebergh, and Dijkgraaf (2004) provided a 
theoretical model of corruption influence on energy efficiency. They found a 
strong correlation between the corruption variable and energy intensity of 
production sectors in the OECD economies over the period from 1982 to 1996. 
The analysis of correlation between institutional and biogeographical conditions 
revealed the significance of the latter; therefore some medical and 
biogeographical determinants may also be used as instrumental variables for the 
institutional strength indices (for review see Olsson, 2003). An example of such 
variables is the country’s geographical distance from the equator suggested by 
Hall and Jones (1999). In our work population death rate is used as one of the 
instrumental variables measuring the capacity of regulatory institutions (following 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, (2000)). 
The distinctive feature of our work is analyzing the influence of climatic 
conditions on economic outcomes. Here we could refer to the recent publications 
by Jeffry Sachs (Bloom and Sachs, 1998; Sachs, 2001) who investigated the 
effects of the mean temperature and some other biogeographical factors on the 
agricultural production in developing countries. 
The well-known approach to measure the scale of unofficial economy in 
transitional countries is using electricity consumption methodology (Gavrilenkov 
& Koen, 1994; Kuboniwa, 1995; Kaufmann and Kaliberda, 1996; Johnson et. al., 
1997, 1998; Schneider and Enste, 2000; Lacko, 2000, Alexeev and Pyle, 2003). 
This method proceeds from the suggestion that electricity consumption is better 
documented by official statistics, electricity factor elasticity of output being fairly 
constant. In this case energy intensity as calculated using official statistics should 
be the higher, the larger the share of unofficial sector is. Recent publications, 
emphasize the overriding role of corruption in the development of shadow 
economy, especially in the developing and transitional economies (Ernste, 
Schneider, 1998; Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobatón, 1998, Friedman, 
Johnson, Kaufmann, Zoido-Labton, 2000; Schneider and Enste, 2000; Dreher et. 
al., 2005; Dreher and Schneider, 2006). The idea of  the complementarity of 
corruption and the shadow economy was also suggested (see also Cule and 
Fulton, 2005). Stricter regulations increase both corruption and the shadow 
economy; at the same time the shadow economy reduces corruption in high-
income countries, but increases corruption in low-income countries (Dreher and 
Schneider, 2006). 
In our regressions, we use estimates of the shadow size in different countries 
provided in some publications (Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann, and P. Zoido-
Lobatón, 2000; Alexeev and Pyle, 2003).  
 
4. Methodology of Research 
 
4.1 Data and Variables 
We use several samples with sizes determined by the requirement for data 
homogeneity and by variations in the number of countries, for which a specific 
type of data is available. Thus, we use a sample including market economies, a 
sample including transition economies and the sample including all of them. 
Availability of the price employment and unofficial economy size statistics 
narrows the number of the countries involved in the research. Since we are 
interested in just the long run differences between the economies we employ the 
cross country analysis rather than the one based on time series. Thus, in order to 
provide the comparability of indicators treated by countries we use PPP income 
variable rather than a real one. Analysis of energy intensity time change indices 
based on the use of real variables was fulfilled as well and showed the results 
which are qualitatively similar to those discussed in the present paper but 
quantitatively less conclusive as compared to them (Suslov, Ageeva, 2005). 
Whereas we focus our analysis on the use of energy as a production factor, we 
restrict the subject of investigation with only the production sphere and remove 
the consumption of energy by households from our consideration. Thus, we deal 
with energy intensity of production and consider the models of firms. The total 
sample refers to the year of 2000 and includes 74 economies and among them - 25 
former socialist ones, 25 OECD countries (without new members) and some other 
economies from Asia, Africa and America as well. The series for unofficial 
economy consists of only 55 observations and concerns the middle of 1990ths 
(Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann, Zoido-Lobaton, 2000; Alexeev and Pyle, 2003).    
 
We use the following information2: 
Y - GDP in PPP.  
E - energy consumption in production sphere. This variable is calculated as the 
total energy supply in the country less the consumption of households and non-
energy use.  
e - energy intensity of production calculated as E /Y. 
DISTE - seasonal temperature fluctuation is used calculated as the difference 
between mean temperature values in January and July for the period of 1961-
1990, measured in tenths of degree centigrade - data from Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 
INST - institutional strength indices obtained from Research project "Governance 
Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002".  The following variables are 
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in Table A1. 
 
used directly in regressions for the year of 2000 (Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-
Lobatón, 1999):  
VOACC (Voice and Accountability) - measures the extent, to which citizens of a 
country are able to participate in the election of governments. 
POIST (Political Instability and Violence) - measures perceptions of the 
likelihood that the government in power will be destabilized or overthrown by 
unconstitutional means.  
GOEFF (Government Effectiveness) - measures quality of bureaucracy and 
credibility of the government's commitment.  
REGBU (Regulatory Burden) - measures the incidence of market unfriendly 
policies including price controls and inadequate bank supervision. 
RULAW (Rule of Law) - measures the extent, to which agents have confidence in 
and abide by the rules of society.  
GRAFT (Graft) - measures perceptions of corruption. 
All these indices are averages for the period of 1996-2000.  
SHUN95 - share of unofficial economy in GDP in the middle of 1990ths. The 
main source of the data for this variable s is the sample provided in (Friedman, 
Johnson, Kaufmann, Zoido-Lobaton, 2000) developed with the help of MIMIC 
approach. From the two series provided in this source (Friedman et. al., 2000, 
Table 1, pp. 266-268) the second one designated as SHARE2 and obtained with 
more intensive use of the demand for electricity methodology demonstrated a 
higher significance in our regressions. In addition, we introduce into this sample 
alternative indices for 11 CIS countries calculated using earlier estimates for 
corresponding former Soviet republics and dynamic indices of electricity 
consumption (Alexeev and Pyle, 2003). The series constructed proved itself to 
have still higher significance in our regressions, so, we considered it as the most 
appropriate measure for the size of shadow economy. 
pE - end use energy price for industry. It was calculated using statistical data from 
two sources: 1) IEA database – end-use prices for industry for different energy 
products for 2000 and for the year of 2001 for Latin America economies; 2) 
Transition Report, EBRD, 2001 - electricity tariffs for industry for the transitional 
countries for the year of 2000. For each energy product a partial price index was 
calculated as compared to the USA level. Since the above-mentioned databases 
are not complete, we obtained different numbers of such indices (from 1 to 6) for 
different countries. Further for each economy aggregate, a price energy index was 
computed as a geometrical mean of all the partial indices. For 2000, we 
supplemented the total sample by 20 economies from Latin America. The prices 
for them were taken from IEA database, for which only the data after 2001 were 
available. Each energy product price was adjusted using its annual 2001 price 
index. The latter was obtained as the geometrical mean of such indices for all the 
countries. The indices obtained we considered as estimate of the true energy 
prices in these countries and used in the regressions. 
P - average output price calculated as a relation of nominal GDP in US$ to PPP 
GDP. 
The following variables are used as the instrumental ones: oil import cost per unit 
of oil (IEA data), citizens’ death rate and infant mortality rate (data from World 
Development Indicators 2002 CD-ROM).  
Some additional variables used are introduced further in the respective sections of 
the paper. 
 
4.2 Theoretical Model. 
As a theoretical framework to construct a specific macroeconomic demand for 
energy function for each economy considered we assume a simple multi-sector 
economic system. For each economy considered m economic sectors are given 
designated by index i. Their technologies  
 
Qi=Fi(Ei,…), i=1,…m                                                                               (1) 
are characteristic of the representative firms in the  sector are described by CES 
production functions. In (1) Qi is the output of the sector i, Ei is the energy 
consumption in this sector. The existence of other production factors is designated 
by suspension points (…). We assume that sector production functions in all the 
economies have equal partial elasticities of substitution, though can differ by 
some other parameters (see below). 
Given the equilibrium on competitive markets sector i the demand for energy Ei is 
obtained: 
 
Ei = [α i⋅Ai-ρi⋅(Pi/pE)]σi⋅Qi,                                                                          (2) 
 
where α i- is the energy factor intensity coefficient, pE and Pi are energy and 
output prices respectively, σ i –stands for the partial elasticity of substitution 
between energy and another factor, ρ i – is the parameter such that 1/(1+ρ i)=σ i, 
and Ai –stands for the efficiency coefficient. Now the energy intensity of the 
economies as follows: 
 
e =∑  si⋅[α i Ai-ρi⋅(P/pE)]σi                                                                            (3) 
 
where si is the sector i share in the economy output. 
 
Taking into account climatic differences of the economies. Energy intensity of 
production in various countries can differ from each other due to climatic 
conditions. To introduce this factor into the model we consider a variable DISTE 
being a measure of climate severity: the more severe the climate in a given 
country is, the higher the variable DISTE. 
Further both the intensity parameters of energy factor and the parameters of 
general efficiency are specified as functions of DISTE: α i=α i(DISTE) and Ai= 
Ai(DISTE) so that dα i/d(DISTE)>0 and dAi/d(DISTE)<0, i.e. in the countries 
with more severe climate, energy and other production resource intensity of 
production is objectively higher.  
 
Failures of institutional development and the lack of incentives for energy 
conservation. In order to include in the model the influence of institutional 
development on corporate energy conservation incentives and, in turn, on energy 
intensity levels in different countries, we consider a sector framework of Cournot 
equilibrium. It is assumed that in any production sector (hereinafter omitting 
sector indices) there are n symmetrical firms holding some degree of market 
power none of which holds a leading position. Their production functions depend 
on the energy factor E and some other factors necessary for production process 
but not for trading and interacting with other companies and organizations within 
the mechanisms determined by institutional environment. We specify transaction 
cost of a firm as a total cost of an economic agent on interaction with all his 
partners (Polterovich, 1999). In such a view it includes some explicit fraction 
which could be easily taken into account when calculating the total project cost, 
and a certain implicit fraction being a sum of both monetary but unofficial 
transaction cost (e.g. bribes) and non-monetary component, such as “efforts”. By 
our proposition if economic institutions are bad and by this reason the markets are 
ineffective the total transaction cost could be high especially due to its implicit 
fraction. As we attempt to show, even having technological options to substitute 
more expensive production resources (e.g. energy factor) for cheaper ones, firms 
may fail to implement the corresponding investment projects fearing high implicit 
transaction costs of their implementation. Further we present a sector model 
describing equilibrium before the rise in the energy price assuming all the firms 
symmetrical and equilibrium established after the energy price increase allowing 
for different reactions of the firms.  
We predict that the worse the institutions are in a given economy, the lower the 
probability of any representative firm reacting adequately to the changes in the 
factor price ratios and, thus, the lower the number of the firms changing the 
combinations of the production factors is. 
Let Qj be the output of a sector firm j, so, the total sector output is Y=!
=
n
j
jQ
1
. The 
firm j cost function C(Qj)=cQּj is identical for all the firms since they are 
considered symmetrical and if their economic behaviors do not differ. This is our 
starting point, though in the case of different reactions of two firms to price 
change their cost functions change differently as well, thus, in this case they are 
not identical.  
We assume a demand function for the sector output is linear and present it in the 
inverse form: 
 
P=G-H⋅Y,                                                  (4) 
 
where P stands for the sector output price G and H denotes positive function 
parameters. By our proposition this function includes also the competition from 
the foreign firms. 
Consider sector equilibrium before any price shock: 
 
Q0j=Q=(G-c)/(H⋅(n+1)),                             (5) 
Y0=n⋅Q0=n/(n+1)⋅(G-c)/H,                     (6) 
P0=(G+n⋅c)/(n+1).                                  (7) 
 
Now consider a β – fold rise in the energy price with β>1. The proper reaction of 
a firm, which we term “the adjustment project,” is adjusting its cost to the new 
price combination by substituting any other production factors for energy. We 
assume that firms take this course if transaction cost of adjusting is low, and avoid 
it if the expect transaction cost to be high. Thus, each of the firms considered has 
to solve the following problem: 
 
max {Pe⋅F(E,…)-pE⋅E-!
"Jj
pj⋅Xj-tc⋅φ(e0-E/F(E,…))}       (7) 
Pe=G-H⋅(!
=Ll
Qle+F(E,…))               (8) 
 
where in addition to previous designation, pj⋅- denotes the price of a non-energy 
factor j, Xj – stands for the input of the non-energy factor j, the initial output 
energy intensity being e0=E0/Q0, Yle  is an output expected by the firm considered 
from another company l, J is a set of indices denoting all the used non-energy 
factors, so that j∈J, L – set of indices designating all the firms other than a given 
one.  Thus, the sum !
=Ll
Qle means the expectation of a given firm about the outputs 
of all (n-1) others and, so, Pe is expected output price depending on this 
expectation. Function φ(...) is a Dirichlet type function with φ(x)=0 if x=0 and 
φ(x)=1 in other cases, and the variable tc=(0, h) has only two values - of low and 
high levels of transaction cost. For simplicity, we assume that low transaction cost 
does not affect the company’s activity at all and it is therefore taken to be zero. If 
it is high, its level is designated by h, and it is high  enough to stop an adjustment 
project (specifically by the implicit fraction).  
After the increase in the energy price, the general set of the firms breaks into two 
subsets. The first one includes k firms, which face low transaction cost and thus 
implement the adjustment projects. The second subset consists of (n-k) firms 
facing high transaction cost and therefore rejecting adjustment behavior.  
For convenience of the further discussion, we provide a solution for the situation 
when transaction costs are high for all the n firms. In this case, all the firms 
experiencing a rise in the energy price also face a rise in the cost per unit of 
output, indicated by Δc1. Thus, the cost per unit of output when a firm faces high 
transaction cost is c1=c+Δc1. In this case, the equilibrium solution Q1, Y1=n⋅Q1, P1 
differs from the initial one as follows: Y1< Y0, Q1< Q0, P1> P0 due to the new unit 
cost c1 is higher than initial level c. 
Now consider a case when k<n and, so, k firms adjust their production factors 
combinations to new the price structure. Each of them reduces the energy 
intensity of its output by Δe and the cost per unit of output by Δc2, thus, its unit 
cost is c1-Δc2= c+Δc1-Δc23.  
Designate by ΔQ+(k) the output increment from the level Q1 of a firm, which 
implements the adjustment project , and by ΔQ-(k)  from this level for the 
company rejecting it, the argument k in brackets means that k firms implement the  
adjustment project. The increment of the solution with respect to the level (Y1, Q1, 
P1) can be calculated as follows: 
 
ΔQ+(k)=(n-k+1)⋅ Δc2/[H⋅(n+1)], k=1,…, n      (9) 
ΔQ-(k)=-k⋅Δc2/[H⋅(n+1)], k=1,…, n-1    (10) 
ΔY(k)=k⋅Δc2/[H⋅(n+1)], k=1,…, n    (11) 
ΔP(k)=-k⋅Δc2/(n+1), k=1,…, n      (12) 
 
                                                           
3 Obviously a condition Δc1-Δc2>0 holds. 
where ΔY(k) and ΔP(k) stand for the increments of the total sector output and the 
market price correspondingly, given that k firms undertake the adjustment project. 
It would be natural to assume that Q1(k)+ΔQ-(k)≥0 for each k, which is 
guarantied if  
 
G-c1-n⋅Δc2= G-c-Δc1-n⋅Δc2≥0.             (13) 
 
This condition seems fairly natural. For instance, if firms’ production functions 
have unit elasticity of substitution, then Δc2 =[(β-1)⋅α-(βα-1)]⋅c, with β, as 
before, standing for the index of energy price increase4.  
 
Our basic assumption is that the number of the firms facing low transaction cost k 
is strongly dependent on the quality of institutions: the higher the quality, the 
higher the number k is. We assume it is zero if institutions are very bad and 
provide for no incentives for adjustment to energy price change and it is close to n 
if institutions provide for strong incentives. 
 
PROPOSITION: Let n symmetrical firms having production function of type (1)5 operate in a 
given sector and the sector demand function be as (4). Let the sector to reach Cournot equilibrium. 
After an increase in the price for the energy factor pE, each firm solves the problem (7)-(8), k firms 
face low transaction costs associated with the implementation of adjustment projects, and (n-k) 
firms face high transaction cost. Then the final value of the sector energy intensity, measured as 
!
=
n
j 1
Ej/Y is the lower, the higher k is. 
 
PROOF: Let the energy intensity of a firm before the price shock be e1, then after the energy price 
increases, the firms, which undertake adjustment projects have energy intensity e2 with e2<e1 
which holds true by the property of the production function. The value of energy intensity of the 
firms not undertaking adjustment projects stays e1. Thus, the value of the sector energy intensity 
under condition that k firms undertake adjustment projects e(k) is: 
 
e(k)=s(k)⋅  e2+(1- s(k))⋅  e1                       (14) 
 
with s(k) is a share of the firms undertaking adjustment projects in total sector output. At the same 
time, obviously, the value of the sector energy intensity derivative by s is negative because e2<e1. 
So, it is necessary to prove that ds(k)/dk>0, which is not obvious since the rising number of the 
firms implementing the project reduces individual outputs of these firms (due to the equation (9)).  
Construct the value s(k)/(1- s(k)):  
 
s(k)/(1- s(k))= 
[k⋅Q1+k⋅(n-k+1)⋅Δc2/(H⋅(n+1))]:[(n-k)⋅Q1-(n-k)⋅k⋅Δc2/(H⋅(n+1))]       (15) 
 
Indicate θ(k)=k⋅Q1+k⋅(n-k)⋅Δc2/(H⋅(n+1)) and substitute for into (15): 
 
s(k)/(1- s(k))=[θ(k)+k⋅Δc2/(H⋅(n+1))]:[n⋅Q1-θ(k)]                (16) 
 
Due to the condition (13) the derivative of θ(k) with respect to k is positive: 
 
dθ(k)/dk=Q1+(n-2k)⋅Δc2/(H⋅(n+1))=((G-c1+(n-2k)⋅Δc2) /(H⋅(n+1))>0     (17) 
 
Taking into account (17) one can find that the numerator in (16) grows and at the same time the 
denominator reduces as k increases. Thus, the value s(k)/(1-s(k)) is a function  growing by k. The 
                                                           
4 Under α=0.2 doubling of real energy price (β=2) leads to the value of Δc2=0.0513. 
5 Sector index i is omitted. 
latest fact can be true if and only if ds(k)/dk>0. This means that de(k)/dk<0 and the proposition is 
proved.  
 
At this point, we conclude that the weak institutional environment could be 
considered an important factor undermining the efficiency of energy use. Weak 
incentives for change of technologies may result from the high cost of market 
operation. We assume that the value h may be associated with both the market 
performance itself and its interaction with the government including the quality of 
the policy measures and the degree of corruption. As we specified before, this 
value probably includes some monetary component, such as bribes and higher 
taxes, and the non-monetary component are additional attempts of entrepreneurs 
for establishing and maintaining agreements.  
 
Another important suggestion we make based on the theoretical framework 
discussed in this section is a dependence of the demand for energy price elasticity 
prevailing in a given economy on the quality of institutions. In the model 
considered, we showed that the sector demand for energy reaction to the energy 
change is the stronger, the more firms react adequately to the change in the real 
energy price and, therefore, the stronger the economic institutions are. Thus, it is 
to be expected that in a given national economy the reaction of the aggregate 
demand for energy from the production sphere as a whole will demonstrate the 
same property. For this reason we advance a hypothesis, which will later be tested 
in the next section of this paper, that the price elasticity of the energy demand of 
the production sphere is a function dependent on the quality of economic 
institutions. More specifically, we construct a model of energy intensity of 
production sector for a particular economy and, therefore, specify the price 
elasticity of output energy intensity. This coefficient in general differs from the 
former one.  
The first index, at list given the production function with constant returns to scale, 
captures only the substitution effect. The second one except for the substitution 
effect allows for wealth effect, i.e. the demand change due to change of the 
output. 
First, if the technology considered actually has constant returns to scale it allows 
only for the substitution effect of the real price change. Secondly, if some inputs 
of the production factors cannot change – which is a short-term case – output and 
total cost change may vary not equally and, therefore, the output energy intensity 
may change not only due to substitution of other factors for energy, but also due 
to the variation of the production scale. Moreover, in this situation substitution 
effect itself may be weaker than in the long run because a certain component of 
the energy input may be a quasi-fixed factor.  
 
4.3 Specification 
We use the following specification: 
 
ln(e)=β0+β1⋅DISTE+β2⋅INST⋅ ln(P/pE)+β3⋅  ln(P/pE) +β4⋅ SHUN95 +ε ,    (18) 
 
though the variable INST may designate different institutional variables from 
their total list presented in the section 4.1. We use both several individual 
variables and their combinations. The variable of a combined influence of the real 
energy price and institutions INST⋅  ln(P/pE) is called the interaction term, which 
we use following Polterovich and Popov (Polterovich and Popov, 2004). If it 
proves significant, one could suggest that the institutions affect energy intensity 
through the price system. On the other hand, a simple transformation in (18) helps 
to see that the value [β2⋅INST+β3] is the price elasticity of output energy intensity 
as a function of the institutional strength index, which fit our theoretical model. 
The last variable SHUN95 is the size of unofficial economy. Adding this variable 
to the specifications in all the cases drastically improves their quality and without 
significant changes in the estimate coefficients. Moreover, since its individual 
significance is not sufficient in all the cases, we provide the both types of the 
specifications: omitting this variable and including it.  
This specification doesn’t include any structural variables though the share of 
services in the total employment has a certain level of significance if the shadow 
economy size variable is not used. At the same time adding this variable doesn’t 
improve the general quality of the regression estimation. The probable reason why 
our model is not sensible to the structural variables is the fact that institutional 
quality indices are very strongly correlated with a per capita income variable. At 
the same time according to Chenery hypothesis the change of the latter one is 
closely associated with the change of the economic structure: the higher income 
economies have the higher share of the services sphere with lower energy 
intensity as compared to the sphere of goods production.  
 
5. Estimation Results: What are the Main Reasons for High Transaction 
Cost? 
 
We estimated several models in compliance with the formulated theoretical 
framework and provided specification. All of them include control variables 
DISTE and ln(P/pE) but differ by interaction terms and by including or not 
including the shadow economy variable. Adding the shadow economy variable 
(see in the Table A2 in APPENDIX) in all the cases sharply improves the 
significance of the models, though the significance of this variable itself is not 
ever on sufficient level. The reason why the size of the shadow economy variable 
is significant and has positive correlation coefficients is quite clear: in the shadow 
economy the energy consumption is better documented than the generated 
income. Thus, the higher its share in GDP, the greater proportion of income is 
omitted from the official statistics and the higher is observed energy intensity of 
production if other factors are fixed.  
Table 1 
Estimated Energy Intensity of Production in the World Countries, 2000 (dependent variable: ln(Energy 
Consumption per unit per GDP unit) 
Version 1, 74 observations Version 2, 55 observations Variables 
OLS Model IVLS Model OLS Model IVLS Model 
Constant -.2644 
(.1237) 
-.0968 
(.1817) 
-.7080 
(.1676) 
(.1620)* 
-.4949 
(.2788) 
Variable of climate 
conditions: DISTE 
.0025 
(.0005) 
.0026 
(.0005) 
.0033 
(.0005) 
(.0005)* 
.0033 
(.0006) 
Real energy price: ln(P/pE) 
** 
.4046 
(.1039) 
.6298 
(.1993) 
.3422 
(.1098) 
(.1703)* 
.5758 
(.2266) 
Interaction term: 
ln(P/pE)⋅INST*** 
.1294 
(.0476) 
.2491 
(.1019) 
.1075 
(.0517) 
(.0438)* 
.2050 
(.1267) 
Share of Shadow Economy: 
SHUN95 
  .7266 
(.3620) 
(.4066)* 
.6296 
(.6250) 
R-squared 0.3574 0.2948 0.5254 0.4692 
Adj R-squared 0,3298 0.2646 0.4874 0.4267 
F-value 12.98 10.59 13.84 
16.34* 
11.79 
Root MSE .42609 .44636 .34952 .36963 
Hausman test, Chi2  2.10, 
Prob>chi2=    
0.5524 
 1.67, Prob>chi2= 
0.7963 
Cook-Weisberg test, Chi2  0.20,  
Prob>chi2= 
0.6522 
 0.97, 
Prob>Chi2= 
0.3257 
 
*corresponds to the "Sandwich estimator" model 
**instrumented using the logarithm of oil import cost per unit  of oil 
***variable INST is the sum of two institutional indices: GOEFF and GRAFT ; it is instrumented by infant 
mortality rate  
 
We calculated interaction terms using the variable of logarithm of real energy 
price⋅  ln(P/pE) and indices of institutional price from 
(http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance). It turned out that not all of the 
resulting variables were significant in explanation of energy consumption 
sensitivity to energy price change. First two variables VOACC and POIST have 
very low levels of significance (p-values 0.574 and 0.360 respectively) and their 
adding to the regression reduces its general level. Thus, we conclude that neither 
voice and accountability, nor political instability and violence conditions are 
suitable to the problem discussed. We suggest that these mostly political aspects 
do not play a significant role in creating incentives for energy conservation. From 
four other indices, as we found from the analysis provided (see Table A2 in 
Appendix A2), two ones - GOEFF and are GRAFT are highly significant. 
Variables REGBU and RULAW demonstrate either significance at 10% 
coincidence interval, or worse, so, their importance is doubtful but not impossible.  
We can summaries that in any case just the variables responsible for the 
interactions between the bureaucracy and business affect the forming high or 
weak incentives for energy conservation. The role of corruption in defining the 
energy efficiency of production sectors in OECD countries was analyzed in 
(Fredriksson, Vollebergh, and Dijkgraaf, 2004). They showed that there is a 
strong positive correlation between corruptibility and energy use per unit value 
added. In their theoretical model an important role of the government’s 
willingness to be bribed is stressed but to take it into account they use corruption 
perceptions index (Transparency International CPI – see in 
WWW.transparency.de) being similar to the index GRAFT we used. Probably, a 
more suitable proxy for corruptibility is just the variable GOEFF, which 
measures the quality of bureaucracy and credibility of the government's 
commitment. At least we could suggest that our results correspond to both the 
theoretical approach and the empirical findings of the authors referred. They 
provided a panel data analysis for 11 sectors and 14 OECD countries, our 
approach is macroeconomic and based on a single time point data, but includes a 
much broader sample of the economies.  
We also suggest two variables being significant in our model – governance 
efficiency and graft are responsible for the level transaction cost tc affecting the 
incentives to undertake energy saving measures. Inefficient and corrupted 
governments function as a rule in conditions of incomplete and vague legal 
systems involving additional cost for the firms implementing investment projects 
associated with making and supporting contracts, lobbying, bureaucratic 
coordination and “grabbing hands”. 
The final version of the model of energy intensity, which we deem to be the most 
appropriate is presented in the Table 1 both including the shadow economy 
variable (Version 2) and without it (Version 1). The interaction term included into 
this model is calculated using the variable INST being itself just the sum of two 
significant variables GOEFF and GRAFT. The model was tested for possible 
heteroskedastisity and endogenity of independent variables. Cook-Weisberg test 
revealed that the first problem could be important, especially for the second 
version of the model. For this reason we provided estimate using White estimate 
of covariance matrix method (“Sandwich estimator" model). It showed that all the 
factors with the exception of the shadow economy variable are significant at 5 
percent level. The last factor – the share of the shadow economy is significant at 
on the 10 percent level. The price and the institutional variables were 
correspondingly instrumented by oil input unit cost and infant mortality. The 
results of Hausman test suggest that effective models should be preferred. 
 
Table 2 
Institutions’ Quality Indices and Coefficients of Price Elasticity Energy Intensity of Production by Groups of 
Countries in 2000. 
 Indices of institutional strength* Elasticity 
World in Average 0.676 -0.415 
OECD economies 3.064 -0.671 
Transitional economies -0.649 -0.272 
East European economies 0.305 -0.375 
CIS economies -1.656 -0.164 
Russian Federation -1.370 -0.195 
*A sum of two institutional indices: GOEFF and GRAFT; ranged from -5 to +5 
 
We provide our calculations of price elasticity of production energy intensity both 
by the groups of the economies (Table 3) and for each country from the sample 
(Table A3 in Appendix). One can see that these results confirm our theoretical 
assumption: the better the institutions the stronger consumption of per output unit 
responds to changes in real energy price. Particularly, in CIS countries, 
adjustment of energy demand to changes in real energy prices is to be regarded as 
weak: the absolute value of average price elasticity coefficient of energy intensity 
is a quarter of that in OECD countries. ); in the East European and Baltic 
countries this value is also visibly lower than in the developed countries though 
not so crucially (“only” half of the OECD level). This fact means weak incentives 
of firms for energy conservation and, thus, serves an important reason for the 
higher energy intensity of production. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The energy intensity in the most of the world countries was falling down during 
the last decades of the previous century. At the same time in former socialist 
economies it stays essentially higher than the developed countries. In order to 
explain this phenomenon we suggest a theoretical model of an economic sector 
including a certain number of firms, which consume energy and  face the 
necessity of implementing  energy conservation projects under the condition of 
uncertain transaction cost associated with this implementation. The high 
transaction cost completely stops the project but low transaction cost does not 
affect the behavior of the firms. We show that the inadequate institutional 
environment leading to a high probability for a firm to be faced with adverse 
external conditions resulting in the high transaction cost brings about the lack of 
incentives for energy conservation.   Thus, under such a condition, the substitution 
effect of energy price change is weaker than in tough market environment. This 
fact means that higher transaction costs worsen the incentives for energy 
conservation. 
Our econometric model permits one to calculate energy price elasticity of 
production energy intensity, which is a value similar to price elasticity of 
conditional demand for energy. Analysis showed that two institutional variables 
from their common list provided in (Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón, 1999) 
have high significance levels. They are – “government effectiveness” and “graft”. 
Using the estimates results we provided coefficients of energy price elasticity of 
production energy intensity both by the groups of the economies and for each 
economy from the sample. We show that the average of these coefficients for the 
group of CIS economies is more than four times lower than that for the OECD 
economies (by their absolute values); in the East European and Baltic countries 
this value is also visibly lower than in the developed countries though not so 
crucially (“only” two times). This fact means weak incentives of firms for energy 
conservation and, thus, serves an important reason for the higher energy intensity 
of production. 
The main conclusion from our analysis is a primacy of institutional development 
with respect to special policy measures aimed at energy conservation. The latter 
would not be efficient enough if market incentives for energy saving are weak. 
We suggest that to strengthen them the following measurements should be 
undertaken: 
 well recognized measures to protect property rights and to support 
contracts (development of market legislation, legal systems, opposing 
corruption), 
 improving the quality of economic policy and reputation of the 
government, a minimization of incidence of market unfriendly policies 
including price controls and inadequate bank supervision,  
 further development of the banking systems and the stock markets, 
 improving the corporate governance of the enterprises, strengthening 
internal control in the firms, setting proper incentive systems for saving of 
production resources, 
 policies supporting small and medium-size firms. 
World experiences suggest that in order to strengthen the energy conservation 
governments may conduct additional special measures to support and intensify 
energy conservation: subsidize energy conservation projects, standardize energy 
equipment and support the development of the market of energy conservation 
technologies. Reform of electricity sector being conducted in a large number of 
the countries at present time can effect in a reduction of both the fuel consumption 
in electricity generation and the waste of electric energy during its transportation 
and distribution. An important role could play hardening of environment 
legislation and joining the Kyoto protocol.  
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Appendix 1 
Table A1 
List of Variables 
Variables Contents Sources 
y Labor Productivity, USA=1 WDI 2001 CD-ROM, ILO: 
http:\\laborsta.ilo.org 
e Energy Intensity of Production, USA=1 IEA data: http://data.iea.org, 
2001 CD-ROM 
pE Energy Price for Industry, USA=1 http://data.iea.org, WDI 2000, 
Transition Report EBRD, 2001 
P Average output price calculated as a relation of nominal GDP in US$ to 
PPP GDP 
WDI 2001 CD-ROM 
 Import Oil Cost per a Barrel, USA=1 http://data.iea.org 
DISTE Season Temperature Fluctuation, in Tenths of Degree Centigrade IPCC: 
http://ddcweb1.cru.uea.ac.uk 
VOACC Extent to Which Citizens of a Country Are Able to Participate in the 
Selection of Governments., (index: -2.5 - +2.5) 
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/g
overnance/ 
POIST Measures Perceptions of the Likelihood that the Government in Power 
Will be Destabilized or Overthrown by Unconstitutional Means, (index: -
2.5 - +2.5) 
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/g
overnance/ 
GOEFF Measures Quality of Bureaucracy and Credibility of the Government's 
Commitment, (index: -2.5 - +2.5) 
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/g
overnance/ 
REGBU Measures Incidence of Market Unfriendly Policies Including price 
Controls and Inadequate bank Supervision, (index: -2.5 - +2.5) 
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/g
overnance/ 
RULAW Measures the Extent to Which Agents Have Confidence in and Abide by 
the Rules of Society, (index: -2.5 - +2.5) 
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/g
overnance/ 
GRAFT Measures Perceptions of Corruption, (index: -2.5 - +2.5) http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/g
overnance/ 
INST GOEFF+ GRAFT  
SHUN95 Share of Unofficial Economy in GDP for Former Socialist Republics, 
1995, % 
Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann, 
Zoido-Lobaton, 1999; Alexeev 
and Pyle, 2001 
 Infant mortality rate WDI 2001 CD-ROM 
